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Daily we encounter numerous
alternative courses of action
among which we must choose.
These alternatives vary in
complexity and consequence.
Some alternatives are considered
lightly, such as the way to turn on
the journey home. Others require
fervent deliberation, such as
Hamlet’s agonizing decision
whether to end his life. The neural
basis of decision making has been
reviewed extensively [1–4], so the
goal of this primer is to orient the
interested reader to this growing
literature with emphasis on
neurophysiological work, rather
than the expansive literature on
functional brain imaging and
neuropsychology. Another goal is
to articulate the key concepts of
choosing, deciding, intending and
acting [5,6]. Dwelling on
terminology may seem an
unnecessary tangent, but science
travels on its vocabulary —
inconsistent and vague terms can
only yield confusion. This is all the
more important when the object of
this scientific investigation
ultimately is nothing less than
human agency.
Choice
A choice is required when an
organism is confronted with
alternatives for which an action is
required to acquire or avoid one of
the alternatives because of a desire,
goal or preference. In its most
fundamental sense, a choice is an
overt action performed in the
context of alternatives for which
explanations in terms of purposes
can be given. Consider the options
of selecting between two
envelopes, A and B, containing
different amounts of money
(Table 1). Choice #1 is easy because
it offers the guarantee of obtaining
$1,000 by selecting envelope A,
instead of $1 by selecting envelope
B. Choice #2 requires more thought
because the amount of money is
unpredictable, but a suitable
analysis leads to a wise choice.
Choice #3 requires deliberation to
contend with a paradox of choice
prediction [7]. Regardless of the
complexity of the alternatives,
though, you must execute your
choice through some action, such
as grasping one of the envelopes.
Choices have particular
characteristics. First, choices are
evaluated as good or bad
according to whether goals are
achieved and consequences are as
expected. Second, choices take
time; a choice process evolves
from a state of more or less
equipotentiality immediately after
the alternatives are presented to a
state of commitment before the
overt action is performed. Third,
with prior knowledge of the
alternatives and preferences, some
choices can be predicted.
According to this definition,
neurophysiological correlates of
choice behavior are studied
whenever an experimental subject
has alternative responses. This has
been studied, for example, with
psychophysical discrimination [8]
and visual search [9]. With easily
distinguished alternatives and
predictable reinforcements, like
choice #1, the neural
representation of the stimuli is
resolved unambiguously, leading to
an earlier and more accurate motor
response. When the stimuli are
more difficult to distinguish [10,11]
or the reinforcement becomes less
predictable [12,13], like choice #2,
the neural representation of the
alternative choices takes more time
to resolve, and that representation
can be modulated by the expected
value of the choice.
Finally, although no
neurophysiological studies have
been conducted in the context of
Newcomb’s paradox, new studies
are exploring situations in which
the experimental subject chooses
alternatives supposedly based on
the actions of another agent [14].
Choices made in the context of the
choices of another agent are also
guided by reinforcement history,
but also with some sensitivity to the
strategies employed by the other
agent. This progression of
experimental conditions should
make clear that some choices are
easy and others are hard. When
alternatives are vague, payoffs are
unclear and stakes are high, then it
seems natural to regard the
subjects as making a decision
before they act.
Decision
The term decision is used casually
and technically in several, not
entirely consistent senses. On the
one hand, decision theory
describes the characteristics of
effective behavior in relation to
expected consequences [15]. For
example, the best solution to the
second choice in Table 1 is to
select the envelope for which the
product of the probability and the
monetary amount is greatest. This
is the domain of decision theory
and related frameworks, such as
economics and game theory. A
very active area of inquiry of late
has employed concepts of
decision theory and related
disciplines in the investigation of
the neural preliminaries of choice
behavior [16].
Table 1. Choices based on predicted monetary reward.
Envelope A Envelope B
Condition Payoff Condition Payoff
#1 100% $1,000 100% $1
#2 9% $10,000 90% $1,000
#3 100% $1,000 If only B $1,000,000
If A and B $0
Two envelopes labeled A and B are offered for you to obtain. Choice #1 is between two
transparent envelopes; envelope A contains $1,000 and envelope B, $1. Choice #2 is
between two opaque envelopes. Envelope A has a 9% chance of containing $10,000 and
envelope B has a 90% chance of containing $1,000. Choice #3 is Newcomb’s paradox.
Envelope A is transparent and contains $1,000. Envelope B is opaque and will contain either
$1 million or nothing. You will be given the choice of taking either B alone or A with B.
Before you are presented with the envelopes, an infallible brain scan is done to predict your
choice. If the prediction is that you will choose only envelope B, then $1 million is placed in
it. If it is predicted that you will choose both envelope A and B, then nothing is put in
envelope B.
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On the other hand, we can refer
to a decision as a process that
results in the overt act of choosing.
Such a process must have a
particular architecture, but
measures of outcome derived from
decision theory do not uniquely
specify mechanism. Decision as a
process has two logically and
practically distinct meanings. We
must distinguish between decide
to, which is a selection between
alternative actions, and decide
that, which is a selection between
alternative categories of an image
or concept. The logical distinction
is easy to see. You can decide that
falsely, but you cannot decide to
falsely — it is not intelligible. The
decision that envelope B always
contained $1 million is false, but in
what sense can you decide falsely
to take envelope B? You just take it
or you do not. Decide to, like
choosing, is judged as good or
bad, but not as true or false.
The fact that choices can be
predicted makes it possible to
choose in advance: it is intelligible
to say, “I will choose envelope B
when given the opportunity.” This
sense of choice is more related to
decision. But important
distinctions must be recognized
between ‘choose’ and ‘decide to’.
Whereas ‘choice’ refers most
directly to the final commitment to
one among the alternative actions,
‘decision’ refers most directly to
the deliberation preceding the
action. Deliberation involves
weighing the options which
amounts to contrasting the
characteristics of the alternatives
in working memory. Such
deliberation is rarely (if ever) only
rational, for emotional valence
influences decisions too [17].
The polarity of deciding and
choosing can be highlighted by
contrasting the three choices in
Table 1. For any of the three, you
must enact a choice by grasping
an envelope (you could just point
or speak to choose through
symbolic actions, but some
movement must occur). But it is
likely that, before you can make
choices #2 or #3, you must invest
more effort to comprehend the
alternatives, understand the
differences between them and
identify which would be most
satisfying. The course of this
deliberation reveals another
defining feature of decisions that
distinguishes them from choices:
decisions cannot be predicted,
even by the agent. If you can say
what you will decide, then you will
have decided.
In other words, decisions, like
perceptions, just happen;
introspection cannot find the
source of a decision [18]. By
monitoring the activity of the
neurons that produce the decision
as described above, however, it
becomes possible to predict the
choice. Morever, it is also possible
to manipulate decisions by
electrical stimulation [19]. But this
ability to predict and manipulate
choices has strict limits; most
fundamentally, it requires proper
experimental control of numerous
extraneous variables. Thus, while it
is appropriate to contemplate the
ethical and legal ramifications of
this technical breakthrough [20],
the social fabric is unlikely to be
torn by it very soon.
Choice #3 provides a useful
domain in which to clarify further
these ideas. It is based on the
premise that a person’s choice can
be predicted reliably (by a brain
scan perhaps). The rules of this
choice are explained in Table 1.
Imagine that you have observed
others make this choice and that
every time they took only envelope
B, it contained $1 million; and
every time they took both,
envelope B was empty. Would you
reason that the choice prediction is
reliable and so choose only
envelope B to become a
millionaire? Or would you reason
that, once the prediction was made
and you are presented with the
selection, the contents of the
envelopes will not change, and so
choose both envelopes so as not
to forego the obvious $1,000? Both
arguments seem sound, but they
cannot both be correct, so which is
wrong? Your reaction to the
contents of the envelopes opened
after making choice 3 may be
pleasure or distress, according to
whether the outcome was
consistent with your intention.
What did you mean to do?
Intention
The term intention is complex [21].
The disposition to perform some
act is a central feature of an
intention, but intention cannot be
identified entirely with response
preparation. A statement of
intention must also answer “why
was that done?”. Of course, one
answer might be the causal path
through neurons to muscles, but
this is incomplete. A satisfactory
explanation must address the
reasons for the action based on
preferences, goals and beliefs. In
other words, to judge whether a
movement was intended, one must
refer to the agent’s beliefs about
which action must be performed
under what circumstances to bring
about the desired object of the
intention. A consequence of this is
that intentions may not be realized;
success can be judged only with
reference to the description of the
goal and the conditions under
which it could be achieved [22].
Furthermore, a particular
movement may be intentional
under one description but not
under another; for example, an eye
may wink or blink. The
neurophysiology literature has
used the term intention to refer
only to response preparation [23].
Until nonhuman primates can
report what they meant to do, the
scientific study of intentionality
may be restricted to humans [24].
Action
The term action has been used
above, but it is a complex concept
[25]. Often one does one thing
(obtain money) by doing something
else (pick up an envelope). But all
such descriptions of actions
reduce to a basic action that we
perform without any preliminaries,
such as moving a hand (to grasp
an envelope to obtain money). We
cannot say how we move our
hand; it just happens when we will
it. The neurophysiological basis of
producing basic actions such as
gaze shifts and reaching are
reasonably well understood [26].
Defining a body movement as an
action depends on context. A
purposeful action (a wink) is
distinguished from a mere event (a
blink) by reference to some
intelligible plan, because actions
are performed to achieve a goal. In
other words, actions have reasons
(“I did it for...”), but events just
have causes (“It happened
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because...”). Reasons for actions
are explanations in terms of
purposes, that is, intentions. Thus,
a particular movement may be
intentional under one description
but not under another. With human
subjects it is possible to
distinguish the brain states
producing intentional versus
unintentional movements [27,28].
But if all actions are caused by
neurons firing and muscles
contracting, how can there be any
reasons for actions? Evidence for
many-to-one mapping of brain
states onto movements has
important implications for
elucidating a neural basis of
intentional action [29]. If the
mapping of neural activity onto
movement were one-to-one, the
causal basis of movements would
be clear: a particular action follows
necessarily from a given brain
state as reliably as a reflex. While
such an automatic causal process
seems an adequate account of
certain kinds of movements (such
as blinks), it cannot provide a
satisfactory account of other kinds
(such as winks). Intended
movements are owned (“I did”)
while unintended movements are
not (“it happened”). In other words,
we distinguish the cause of from
the reason for movements [30].
In fact, some have argued that a
many-to-one mapping of neural
activity onto cognition and
behavior provides room for
intentional reasons within neural
causes [31]. If a given basic action
can arise from different brain
states, then the dependence of the
behavior on an intention can hold
in virtue of the content of the
representation of the intention and
not its neural realization, that is,
the content which answers “why
did you do that?”. Thus, a
movement can be called an
intentional action if and only if it
originates from a cognitive state
with meaningful content, and this
content defines the cognitive
state’s causal influence.
This analysis depends on
whether the brain knows what it
means to do. Recent research has
shown that the medial frontal lobe
registers error and success [32].
For example, in monkeys
performing a task requiring the
interruption of a planned action,
neurons signaling errors and
omission of earned reinforcement
were observed in the medial frontal
lobe [33]. Such signals can be
used to adjust behavior and
provide the basis for distinguishing
“I did” from “it happened”.
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